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Abstract—We consider the falsification of temporal logic prop-
erties as a method to test complex systems, such as autonomous
systems. Since these systems are often safety-critical, it is impor-
tant to assess whether they fulfill given specifications or not. An
adaptive cruise controller for an autonomous car is considered
where the closed-loop model has unknown parameters and an
important problem is to find parameter combinations for which
given specification are broken. We assume that the closed-loop
system can be simulated with the known given parameters, no
other information is available to the testing framework. The
specification, such as, the ability to avoid collisions, is expressed
using Signal Temporal Logic (STL). In general, systems consist
of a large number of parameters, and it is not possible or feasible
to explicitly enumerate all combinations of the parameters. Thus,
an optimization-based approach is used to guide the search for
parameters that might falsify the specification. However, a key
challenge is how to select the objective function such that the
falsification of the specification, if it can be falsified, can be
falsified using as few simulations as possible. For falsification
using optimization it is required to have a measure representing
the distance to the falsification of the specification. The way
the measure is defined results in different objective functions
used during optimization. Different measures have been proposed
in the literature and in this paper the properties of the Max
Semantics (MAX) and the Mean Alternative Robustness Value
(MARV) semantics are discussed. After evaluating these two
semantics on an adaptive cruise control example, we discuss their
strengths and weaknesses to better understand the properties of
the two semantics.
Index Terms—Testing, Falsification, Max Semantics, Mean
Alternative Robustness Value, Autonomous Driving.
I. INTRODUCTION
For autonomous systems in general and autonomous vehi-
cles in particular, it is critical to use rigorous testing methods
so that such vehicles will be significantly safer than they
are with humans in the loop. Autonomous systems consist
of perception, sensor-fusion, decision and control modules
implemented in software that interact with the physical sensors
and actuators of the system. As remarked in [1], the biggest
challenge for autonomous vehicles is in creating an end-to-
end design and deployment process that integrates the safety
concerns. Formal verification and correct by construction tech-
niques should certainly be used for those sub-systems where
they can be applied. However, it is known [2] that for hybrid
systems, i.e., systems consisting of both digital and analog
components, the problem of deciding if a state is reachable
or not, is undecidable in general. Thus, for any autonomous
systems of reasonable complexity, testing will be an important
part of the design process.
Model-based design is often used for the design of au-
tonomous systems, and building high fidelity models of both
software and hardware is a part of the design process. Since
testing on physical hardware is both time-consuming and
limited by the available physical hardware, it is an advantage
to do as much testing as possible using only the models. One
approach [3] is to use formal specifications of properties that
the closed-loop system should satisfy combined with the use
of simulation of the models to evaluate whether the desired
properties are fulfilled or not. This can be combined with
falsification techniques that search for counterexamples to
given specifications of the closed-loop system.
Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL) [4] and Signal
Temporal Logic (STL) [5] can be used to describe real-time
properties of systems. Several quantitative semantics for these
logics have been proposed to not only allow reasoning about
the correctness of a signal with respect to a model but also
give a real value that indicates how far a signal is from
satisfying or violating a specification. During falsification,
these values are used by an optimizer to find new input
signals with a higher likelihood of violating the specification.
The quantitative semantics chosen will influence the efficiency
of the falsification procedure, and the efficiency of different
quantitative semantics is problem-dependent.
To facilitate different quantitative semantics the concept of
Valued Booleans (VBools) was introduced in [6]. Multiple
quantitative semantics can be expressed using VBool, for
example the MAX semantics, that is a widely used semantics
for optimization based falsification. Also [7] introduced
and investigated several alternative robustness measures, of
which the Mean Alternative Robustness Value (MARV) will
be considered here.
In this paper, we evaluate the feasibility of automated
falsification techniques for one sub-system, an adaptive cruise
controller, of an autonomous vehicle. The purpose of this
paper is not to evaluate how automated falsification techniques
can be used for fully autonomous vehicles but to improve
our understanding of how different semantics can be used to
facilitate the falsification process. Given formal specification
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and simulation traces, the semantic will result in a scalar that
not only expresses if the specification is fulfilled or not but
also to what extent. This additional information is used by an
optimizer to adjust the input signals and parameters to the next
simulation with the intent of finding a new set of input signals
and parameters that are more likely to falsify the specification.
We aim with this paper to show how a rigorous method
based on optimization can be used in the design process of
autonomous vehicles and to give the reader an insight into how
the quantitative semantics works for this particular problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the falsification of temporal properties. Section III
introduces the adaptive cruise controller example. Section IV
evaluates the performance of the optimization algorithm when
using MAX and MARV . Finally, Section V summarizes the
contributions.
II. FALSIFICATION
Falsification of temporal logical properties is based on
an optimization procedure where the objective function is
determined by the definition of a robustness semantics for the
temporal logic formalism. Breach [8] and S-TaLiRo [9] are
two tools implemented on top of Matlab/Simulink that can
do falsification assuming that the closed-loop system can be
simulated. In this work, Breach is used for the simulation and
hence STL [10] is used to model the specifications, but the
discussion in this paper can be applied to MITL used in S-
TaLiRo as well.
A. Signal Temporal Logic
The syntax of STL is defined as follows [11]:
ϕ ::= μ | ¬μ |ϕ ∧ ψ |ϕ ∨ ψ |[a,b]ψ |♦[a,b]ψ |ϕU[a,b]ψ,
where the predicate μ is μ ≡ μ(x) > 0; ϕ and ψ are STL
formulas; [a,b] denotes the globally operator between a and
b; ♦[a,b] denotes the finally operator between a and b; and U[a,b]
denotes the until operator between a and b. The semantics of
STL are defined by considering the discrete signal x at time
instant k [11]:
(x, k) |= μ ⇔ μ(x[k])
(x, k) |= ¬μ ⇔ ¬((x, k) |= μ)
(x, k) |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ (x, k) |= ϕ ∧ (x, k) |= ψ
(x, k) |= ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ (x, k) |= ϕ ∨ (x, k) |= ψ
(x, k) |= [a,b]ϕ ⇔ ∀k′ ∈ [k + a, k + b], (x, k′) |= ϕ
(x, k) |= ♦[a,b]ϕ ⇔ ∃k′ ∈ [k + a, k + b], (x, k′) |= ϕ
(x, k) |= ϕ U[a,b]ψ ⇔ ∃k′ ∈ [k + a, k + b] (x, k′) |= ψ
∧ ∀k′′ ∈ [k, k′], (x, k′′) |= ϕ
Instead of just checking the Boolean satisfaction of an STL
formula, the notion of a robust semantics is defined to measure
how far away a specification is from being satisfied. In the next
part, these robust semantics will be introduced.
B. Valued Booleans and MAX semantics
A VBool is a combination of a Boolean value together with
a robustness value, a non-negative real number that indicates
how true or false the VBool is. In [6], VBools are used to
define two semantics aimed at measuring the robustness of
STL formulas in a testing setting; MAX evaluated in this paper,
and the additive semantics.
In this work, the robustness value will be used as a measure
of how convincingly a test passed, or how severely it failed, re-
spectively. The comparison operator ≤v corresponds to ≤ and
takes the difference between its arguments as its robustness.
This is because, in order for the value of x ≤ y to change,
one of the arguments has to change by at least |x− y|.
≤v : R× R → V
x≤v y =
{
(, y − x) if x ≤ y
(⊥, x− y) otherwise,
where  and ⊥ denote true and false, respectively.
MAX is defined by the MAX-and, MAX-or, MAX-always,
and MAX-eventually operators.
The MAX-and operator ∧MAX is defined as:
(, x)∧MAX(, y) = (,min(x, y)) (1)
(, x)∧MAX(⊥, y) = (⊥, y)
(⊥, x)∧MAX(, y) = (⊥, x)
(⊥, x)∧MAX(⊥, y) = (⊥,max(x, y)).






where ϕ is a finite sequence of VBools defined for all the
discrete time instants in the interval [a, b].
Other operators, like MAX-or, MAX-eventually and MAX-
until can be expressed in terms of the above operators. These
operators are not used in this paper. For implementation of
MAX in Breach, a VBool is represented as a single real value,
where a negative value represents that the VBool is ⊥, and
a positive value represents that it is . In both cases, the
magnitude of the real value is the robustness value.
C. Mean Alternative Robustness Value (MARV) semantics
In this paper we restrict the comparison to timed always
operators since this is a common temporal operator. For








ρ(ϕ, ti) (ti+1 − ti) ρ ≥ 0
ρ(ϕ, ti) ρ < 0
(3)
where ρ(ϕ, ti) is a real-valued function that gives the objective
value at each time instant, ti, and M is the number of sampling
times over the interval [a, b].
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For positive robustness values, which represent the case
when MARV,[a,b]ϕ is satisifed MARV calculates the mean over
the interval.
III. USE-CASE
This study of the two semantics uses a simple example1
involving two vehicles, an autonomous vehicle, called the ego
vehicle, and a lead vehicle. The two vehicles travel on a road
in the same direction (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1: Definition of the distances between the ego vehicle and the lead vehicle.
The ego vehicle is equipped with adaptive cruise control
(ACC). It has a sensor that measures the relative distance to,
and the relative velocity of, the lead car. The ACC system
operates in two modes: speed mode and safety mode. In the
speed mode, the ego vehicle travels at a driver-set speed, and in
the safety mode, the ego car maintains a safe distance from the
lead car. The ACC system decides which mode to use based
on real-time radar measurements; either it needs to keep a safe
distance, or if the relative distance is safe, it can increase its
speed to the driver-set speed.
A. Specification of Safe Longitudinal Distance
As mentioned earlier, safety guarantees are important in
autonomous driving. However, the safe distance between two
vehicles depends on many parameters, including road friction,
braking force, and response time. These parameters are largely
unknown: while some of these parameters might be estimated
by the ego vehicles, less is known about, for example the
maximal braking force of the lead vehicle. Various studies,
[12], [13], have addressed the issue of the minimum safe lon-
gitudinal distance between two vehicles. In our experimental
setup the controller in the ACC system is designed to keep the
safe distance dsafe between the two vehicles by calculating the
set-point distance using the following formula:
dsafe = ddefault + tgap vego, (4)
where ddefault is the standstill default spacing, in this case set
to 10m, and tgap denotes the time gap between the vehicles
which is set to 1.4 s. The distance dsafe is used as a reference
value for the ACC controller, but it cannot be used as a
specification because when the ego car is in the safe mode,
any deceleration by the lead car will make the longitudinal
distance less than dsafe .
Note, the formula above is used to generate the set-point
distance between the two vehicles, but it is not suitable as
a specification because having a shorter distance between
the vehicles does not necessarily imply that a collision will
1A demo example from the Matlab®/Simulink® toolbox.
occur. It is certainly possible to formulate a specification that
models that the two vehicles do not collide by specifying
that the distance between the two vehicles should be positive.
However, falsification may be easier if we strengthen the
specification by exploiting physical insight. In our example, we
will calculate the minimal distance dmin between two vehicles
using the approach in [13] based on physical properties, such
that if the vehicles are never closer than dmin to each other,






















where [x]+ means the maximum of x and 0, and where the
parameters are described in Table I.
The specification used for falsification now expresses that at
all times the relative distance between the cars must be greater
than the safe distance dmin. With T as the simulation time,
this is formulated as:
[0,T ]
(
relative longitudinal distance > dmin
)
. (6)
The falsification process is significantly easier when we
specify that the relative distance between the vehicles must
be at least dmin, rather than just positive. This strengthening
of the specification is justified by, as soon as, the relative
distance between the vehicles is less than dmin, immediate
braking by the lead vehicle might result in a collision. Thus the
specification amounts to assuming worst-case behavior from
the lead vehicle.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the MAX and MARV seman-
tics, falsification of the AD example is studied. The vehicle
parameters used during the simulations of the closed-loop
behavior are presented in Table I.
TABLE I: Parameters used in the example.
Parameters Notations and Values
Velocity of lead car (m/s) vlead
Velocity of ego car (m/s) vego
The driver-set velocity (m/s) vset = 30
Max acceleration of ego car (m/s2) amax,acc = 3
Min acceleration of ego car to full stop (m/s2) amin,brake = -2.5
Max acceleration of lead car to full stop (m/s2) amax,brake = -3
Response time (sec) tr = 0.1
The simulation takes the acceleration of the lead vehicle
alead as input and simulates the behavior of the closed-loop
system. Before a simulation of the closed-loop system starts,
the values of input parameters are selected by the falsification
algorithm; in this example, the parameters are alead0 and
alead1. The simulation time is T = 30 s and the simulation
starts with alead0 chosen in the range [0, 3] and alead1 in the
range [−3, 0]. For both the MAX and MARV semantics the








































































Fig. 2: The objective values for combinations of the accelerations (alead0, alead1) for the two semantics MAX and MARV . Positive values (◦) mean that the
specification is satisfied, while negative values (∗) mean that it is falsified. Note that the signs of the values should be the same for both semantics while the
absolute values might be different.
specification is given by formula (6). To illustrate the similar-
ities and differences between the MAX and MARV semantics
the objective value is calculated for different combinations
of the parameters alead0 and alead1. In this case alead0 and
alead1 are divided into 20 equidistant points resulting in 400
parameter combinations, each requiring its own simulation.
The objective function values calculated for each of the 400
simulations for both MAX and MARV semantics are shown in
Fig. 2. The main purpose of calculating an objective value is to
guide the falsification process in the right direction by choos-
ing the next set of parameters to be simulated such that the
likelihood of falsifying the specification is increased. Note that
in this work we do not assume that gradients can be derived
analytically; instead, they have to be estimated by evaluating
multiple parameter combinations. Ideally, a semantic should be
such that when a parameter change brings the system closer
to falsifying a specification, then the objective value of the
specification should decrease.
By comparing the left and right graphs in Fig. 2 we notice
that they have the same sign for every parameter combination.
This is expected, since the sign indicates if the specification is
fulfilled, which does not depend on which semantics is used.
However, we observe that in the upper right corner (where
close to alead0 = 3 and alead1 = 0) the two semantics result
in different estimates of the gradients. In this region, for MAX
the objective function values are the same for each point (the
upper triangular side of the left graph). In order to illustrate
why, Fig. 3 presents for each choice of alead0 and alead1 the
first time at which the objective value reaches its minimum
when using MAX. We observe that for parameters close to
alead0 = 3 and alead1 = 0, the simulation time at which the
minimal objective value is reached is time 0. The reason for
this can be seen in Fig. 4, which shows the relative and safe
distance, and the velocities of the lead and ego vehicles, when
alead0 = 3 and alead1 = 0. According to this figure, when
the lead car continuously accelerates, the ego car increases its
speed, too. But the ego car has a driver-set velocity limit (30
m/s) so that the relative distance between the vehicles always
increases and the minimum objective function value occurs at
the beginning of the simulation where the relative and safe
distances are the closest. Thus, the MAX semantics consider
the different simulations to be equally good/bad for parameters
that are close to alead0 = 3 and alead1 = 0, resulting in no
information that can be used by the optimization algorithm.
On the other hand, as can been seen in the right graph of























Fig. 3: The simulation time when the minimum objective function value is
reached for the first time for MAX. Note that alead1 is here to the right.
In Fig. 2, where acceleration of the lead vehicle alead0
is in the range [0, 1.2], and alead1 in the range [−3, 0], for
all parameter combinations in these ranges, the ego vehicle
behaves safely and keeps the safe distance from the lead
vehicle. In order to show the behaviour of both vehicles in
these ranges, the relative and safe distances and the velocities
of the ego car vego and the lead car vlead are shown for
alead0 = 0 and alead1 = −3 in Fig. 5. As can be seen, the
relative distance is greater than dmin for the whole of the
simulation, it means when the lead car brakes the ego car
starts braking too, and it can stop within safe distance from
the lead car.
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Fig. 4: The relative and safe distance, and the vehicle velocities for alead0 = 3 and alead1 = 0. The minimum objective function value occurs at time zero,
where the relative and safe distances are the closest.

































Fig. 5: The relative and safe distance, and the vehicle velocities for alead0 = 0 and alead1 = −3.
In Fig. 2, the safety formula (6) is violated where the
objective values are negative. The relative and safe distances,
and the velocities of both cars for the point alead0 = 3 and
alead1 = −3, are shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen, when the
lead car accelerates, the ego car increases its velocity to reach
the driver-set velocity. Then, when the lead car brakes, because
their distance is larger than dsafe (4), the controller is in speed
mode and only after a delay does the ego car switch to safety
mode and adjust its speed to maintain a safe distance from
the lead car. As a result, not only does the relative distance
between the vehicles become less than dmin, but the cars even
crash. Note that while the cars crash at around 22 s in this
scenario, in Fig. 6 the ego car does not stop until around 26
s. This is due to the simple model used in the example that
does not model the actual collision.
By comparing the objective values from the two semantics
MAX and MARV , we observe that since the MAX-always only
considers the minimal value of the objective function it is
possible to end up with objective values that do not differ
between different simulations. Thus, the optimizer has no
information in which direction to further explore the search.
In this example we observed that in this case it might be
beneficial to consider MARV since this semantic will result in
higher objective values when the vehicles move further away
from each other, thus providing information to the optimization
algorithm that might guide the optimizer in the right direction
to falsify the specification.
In this work, we have only considered the objective func-
tions used by the optimization algorithm but not the optimiza-
tion algorithms themselves. However, gradient-free optimiza-
tion algorithms like Nelder-Mead or simulated annealing are
typically used in the falsification process, and it is clear that the
performance of these algorithms depends on having objective
values that are not constant and that direct the search in a
direction where the objective values decrease, increasing the
chances of falsifying the specification.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed how the efficiency of falsification
might be affected by the semantics used to evaluate the specifi-
cation. An adaptive cruise controller is used as an example and
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Fig. 6: The relative and safe distance, and the vehicle velocities for alead0 = 3 and alead1 = −3. At around 14 s the relative distance between the vehicles
becomes less than dmin, and a collision occurs at around 22 s.
the objective is to test if the certain parameter combinations
result in the possibility for two vehicles to collide. Using the
example, we showed a situation where the MAX semantics will
result in the same objective value for closely related parameter
values, while MARV results in a non-constant objective value,
which might guide the optimization algorithm in a direction
that increases the chances of falsifying the specification. The
objective of this paper was not to compare the efficiency of
MAX and MARV , but rather to illustrate with an example
of the importance of choosing a suitable semantics for the
problem at hand. From our experience with industrial-scale
systems we have observed that the simulation time is the most
limiting factor, not the evaluation of the simulation results
using different semantics. Thus, a future strategy might be to
evaluate the simulation using multiple objective functions and
use a high-level algorithm that during the optimization will
take into account multiple objective values computed using
several different semantics.
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